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economic characteristics. The mechanism by which these Korean-Norwegian adoptees were 
assigned to adoptive families is known and effectively random. We use the quasi-random 
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another. Our findings show that family background matters significantly for children's accumulation of 
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children and the parents raising them. In particular, adoptees raised by wealthy parents are more 
likely to be well off themselves, whereas adoptees' stock market participation and portfolio risk are 
increasing in the financial risk taking of their adoptive parents. These intergenerational causal links 
are not driven primarily by inter vivos transfers or bequests. The detailed nature of our data allows us 
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Sammendrag 
En sterk sammenheng i formue på tvers av generasjoner har ført til en debatt om hvorfor barn av rike 
foreldre ofte blir rike selv. I denne artikkelen undersøker vi betydningen av familiebakgrunn for barns 
akkumulasjon av formue og investoradferd som voksne. Vår forskningsdesign gjør at vi kan 
kontrollere for genetiske forskjeller i evner og preferanser, og kartlegge effektene av eksogene 
endringer i bestemte dimensjoner av familiebakgrunn. Våre funn viser at familiebakgrunn er viktig for 
barns akkumulasjon av formue og investoradferd som voksne, selv i situasjoner der det ikke er en 
genetisk relasjon mellom foreldre og barn. 
3 
1 Introduction
Why do children of wealthy parents tend to be well o  themselves? The evidence
of an acceleration of wealth inequality over the past few decades has fueled a
growing interest in this question among policymakers and researchers alike.1 Several
explanations have been proposed. One is a pure selection story; parents may
genetically pass on abilities and preferences, creating intergenerational associations
in income, savings behavior or financial risk taking. This can generate a strong
correlation in wealth across generations even if there is no actual e ect of parents’
wealth or behavior on the child. Another story is one of causation, where children’s
accumulation of wealth depends on the actions of their parents. An intergenerational
causal link can operate through a number of channels, including direct transfers
of wealth (inter vivos or through inheritance), parental investment that promotes
children’s human capital and earnings capacity, or learning of attitudes and traits
that influence children’s savings propensity or financial risk taking.
The research to date has been limited in its ability to distinguish between
selection and causation in the intergenerational correlation of wealth (for a recent
review, see Black and Devereux, 2011). However, sorting out these scenarios is
central to understand how economic conditions or government policies may shape
the persistence of wealth inequality across generations. In this paper, we investigate
the role of family background in determining children’s accumulation of wealth and
investor behavior as adults. Our research design allows us to credibly control for
genetic di erences in abilities and preferences and to identify the e ects of exogenous
changes in specific dimensions of family background.
The analysis is made possible by linking Korean-born children who were adopted
at infancy by Norwegian parents to a population panel data set with detailed
information on disaggregated wealth portfolios and socio-economic characteristics.
We provide empirical evidence and institutional details showing that the mechanism
by which these Korean-Norwegian adoptees were assigned to pre-approved adoptive
families is known and e ectively random. Any relation between the outcomes of the
adoptees and their adoptive parents is therefore driven by the influence parents have
on their children’s environment and not by parents passing on their genes.
We use the quasi-random assignment of the Korean-Norwegian adoptees to
1 See e.g. Piketty and Zucman (2014), Roine and Waldenstrom (2014), and Saez and Zucman
(2014).
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estimate the causal e ects from a child being raised in one type of family versus
another.2 Our findings show that family background matters significantly, even
after removing the genetic connection between children and the parents raising
them. In particular, adoptees raised by wealthy parents are more likely to be well
o  themselves, whereas adoptees’ stock market participation and portfolio risk
are increasing in the financial risk taking of their adoptive parents. To assess the
sensitivity of these results, we perform a number of robustness checks. We show that
our estimates do not change appreciably if we use high quality measures of financial
wealth or cruder measures of gross wealth or net worth; if we estimate the impacts
on the mean wealth or the median wealth; if we measure wealth at the household or
the individual level; and if we vary the age at which wealth is measured.
To help interpret the economic significance of family background, we estimate
intergenerational associations separately for adoptees and their non-adopted siblings.
This enables us to compare the predictive influence of family background when there
is and is not a genetic link between children and the parents raising them. We
find that wealth shows less transmission from parents to adoptees as compared to
non-adoptees, whereas parental transmission of financial risk taking does not depend
on a genetic connection to the child. These findings complement previous evidence
which suggests that measures of human capital show less transmission from parents
to adoptees as compared to measures of risky behavior like drinking or smoking (see
e.g. the review in Sacerdote, 2010).
Taken together, our findings provide new insights into the role of family back-
ground in determining children’s wealth accumulation and investor behavior as
adults. At the same time, they raise a number of questions such as: What are the
mechanisms through which parents influences children? What can we learn from
adoptees about the population of children at large?
We take several steps to shed light on these important but di cult questions.
First, we examine whether the e ects of parental wealth and investor behavior
operate through other observable characteristics of childhood rearing environment.
Our estimates suggest the e ects are not operating through parents’ education and
household income or children’s sibship size and place of residence in childhood.
Second, we show that the predictive influence of parental wealth and investor
behavior remain strong if we condition on observed inputs to children’s wealth
accumulation and financial risk taking, including the adoptees’ education and
labor income as well as the direct transfers of wealth from their parents. One
2As discussed in greater detail later, our analysis uses the same identifications strategy as
Sacerdote (2007) though applied to a distinct question and set of outcomes.
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interpretation of this finding is that di erences in childhood rearing environment
create heterogeneity in wealth and portfolio choices, in part, by shaping the savings
behavior and risk taking of individuals with similar economic resources.3 Consistent
with this interpretation, we find that being raised by parents who take more financial
risk makes the adoptees engage in risky behavior also in contexts other than financial
decision making.
Third, we examine three possible reasons why the external validity of adoption
results might be limited: Adoptive parents may be di erent from other parents;
adoptive parents may treat their children di erently; and adoptees may be di erent
from other children. Using the rich Norwegian data, we try to infer whether any of
these di erences are empirically important in our setting with Korean-born children
who were adopted at infancy. We find suggestive evidence that the adoptive parents
do not di er significantly from other parents when it comes to intergenerational
wealth transmission. Furthermore, the socio-economic characteristics of the Korean-
Norwegian adoptees and their adoptive parents are broadly similar to that of other
children and parents (who are born in the same period).
Our study complements a growing literature on the intergenerational transmission
of wealth. Two studies using U.S. survey data report an elasticity of child wealth
with respect to parental wealth in the range of .32 and .37 (Mulligan 1997; Charles
and Hurst 2003). By comparison, Boserup, Kopczuk, and Kreiner (2013) use
administrative data from Denmark and find a child-parent wealth elasticity of around
.20.4 While these studies have been important in describing the intergenerational
association in wealth across countries, a causal interpretation remains elusive. What
makes our study unique is the ability to credibly control for genetic di erences in
abilities and preferences and to identify the e ects of exogenous changes in specific
dimensions of family background.
While our paper is the first to utilize assignment of adoptees to estimate the
impact of family background on wealth accumulation and investor behavior, the
approach has provided important evidence in other settings. A number of papers
look at the transmission of other socio-economic variables from parents to adoptees
3Theoretical models emphasize a key role for the intergenerational transmission of preferences
and attitudes in the persistence of choices and outcomes (see e.g. Bisin and Verdier, 2000).
Empirical evidence shows that attitudes to risk taking are correlated across generations (see e.g.
Dohmen, Falk, Hu man, and Sunde, 2012), and a number of studies document the importance of
attributes shaped in childhood in determining adult outcomes (Heckman and Mosso 2014).
4The lower child-parent wealth elasticity for Denmark is consistent with cross-country studies
of intergenerational income elasticities (Black and Devereux, 2011). However, Boserup et al. (2013)
suggest the high child-parent wealth elasticity in the U.S. is partly explained by Charles and Hurst
(2003) removing non-positive values of wealth to facilitate a log specification.
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and non-adoptees.5 One concern, however, is that in many adoption studies it is
di cult to establish a causal relationship between family background and children’s
outcomes because of selective placements. Selection e ects can occur because parents
request children with certain characteristics (such as gender and age) or because
the adoption agencies may use information about the adoptees (or their biological
parents) to assign children to adoptive families. A few adoption studies address
this concern. Björklund et al. (2006) and Björklund, Jäntti, and Solon (2007)
use information on the adoptees’ biological parents to control for their observable
characteristics. By comparison, Sacerdote (2007) takes advantage of information
on Korean-born children who were quasi-randomly assigned to approved adoptive
families in the U.S. He finds large e ects on adoptees’ risky behavior and smaller
but significant impacts on their education and income from assignment to adoptive
parents with more education or fewer biological children. Our analysis uses the same
identifications strategy as Sacerdote (2007) though applied to a distinct question
and set of outcomes.
Our paper is also related to a literature in household finance on why observa-
tionally equivalent individuals make widely di erent financial decisions, such as
whether to invest in the stock market and the choice of portfolio risk (Campbell,
2006; Guiso and Sodini, 2013). This literature aims at sorting out the underlying
contributions of pre-birth factors, including genes and prenatal environment, from
post-birth factors such as family environment. Important evidence comes from
behavioral genetics decomposition of financial risk-taking (Cesarini, Johannesson,
Lichtenstein, Sandewall, and Wallace, 2010; Barnea, Cronqvist, and Siegel, 2010)
and saving decisions (Cronqvist and Siegel, 2015) of identical and fraternal twins.
These studies suggest that an individual’s financial decisions has a significant genetic
component, while family environment plays a minor role. However, recent work
opens the possibility that twin studies overestimate the genetic pre-determination of
individual behavior at the expense of family environment (see e.g. Björklund et al.,
2006; Sacerdote, 2010; Calvet and Sodini, 2014). To directly compare what we find
to the household finance literature, we provide an interpretation of our data through
the lens of a behavioral genetics model. The results from this model indicate that
family environment is more importance than genes in explaining the variation in
children’s financial risk taking if the researcher uses data on (randomly assigned)
adoptees instead of twins.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents our data.
5See e.g. Dearden, Machin, and Reed (1997); Björklund, Lindahl, and Plug (2006); Sacerdote
(2007); Plug (2004); and Holmlund, Lindahl, and Plug (2011).
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Section 3 describes how the adoptees were assigned to families. Section 4 presents our
research design, describes our main findings, and discusses their economic significance
and robustness. Section 5 explores mechanisms, assesses the generalizability of the
lessons from adoptees, and compares our findings to results from behavioral genetics
decompositions. The final section summarizes and concludes.
2 Data and sample selection
Below we describe our data and sample selection, while details about the data
sources and each of the variables are given in Appendix Table B.1.
2.1 Data sources and variable definitions
Our analysis employs several data sources from Norway that we can link through
unique identifiers for each individual and family. Information on adoptees comes
from the national adoption registry, which contains records on all native-born and
foreign-born adoptees since 1965. The data set includes information about the
adoptees (such as date of birth, gender, country of origin, date of adoption) and
identifiers of the adoptive parents. We merge this information with administrative
registers provided by Statistics Norway, using a rich longitudinal database that
covers every resident from 1967 to 2011. For each year, it contains individual socio-
economic information (including sex, age, marital status, educational attainment,
income, and gross wealth) and geographical identifiers. Over the period 1993-2011,
we can link these data sets with information for every Norwegian on most types of
assets holdings and liabilities (such as real estate, financial portfolio, debt). The
values of assets holdings and liabilities are measured at the last day of the year.
These data have several advantages over those available in most other countries.
First, there is no attrition from the original sample due to refusal by participants
to consent to data sharing. In Norway, these records are in the public domain.
Second, our income and wealth data pertain to all individuals, and not only to jobs
covered by social security, individuals who respond to wealth surveys, or households
that file estate tax returns. Third, most components of income and wealth are
third-party reported (e.g. by employers, banks and financial intermediaries) and
recorded without without any top or bottom coding. And fourth, unique identifiers
allow us to match spouses to one another and parents to children.
The key limitation of our wealth data is that tax appraisals of real estate do
not reflect the actual market values.6 Therefore, our main analysis focuses on
6The Norwegian Tax Authorities stipulates that the tax value of real estate should be about 25
percent of the market value (Fagereng, Gottlieb, and Guiso, 2013). However, the tax values are
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financial wealth, which includes bank deposits, bonds, stocks (of listed and non-listed
companies), mutual funds and money market funds. We take three year averages of
financial wealth of each household to reduce the influence of transitory changes, as
often done in the literature (see e.g. Charles and Hurst, 2003; Boserup et al., 2013).7
To analyze how people compose their investment portfolio, we follow the literature
in considering a two asset-portfolio: Risky assets are defined as the sum of mutual
funds with a stock component and directly held stocks; the other components of
financial wealth are classified as non-risky assets. Our primary measure of portfolio
risk, which we denote risky share, is the proportion of the financial wealth invested
in risky assets over the three year period. We complement this measure of portfolio
risk with a stock market participation indicator, taking the value one if at least some
fraction of financial wealth is invested in risky assets over the three year period.
Broadly similar measures of financial risk taking have been used by recent studies of
financial risk-taking, such as Cesarini et al. (2010), Barnea et al. (2010), and Calvet
and Sodini (2014).
While focusing on financial wealth helps in addressing concerns about measure-
ment error, it raises the question of whether our findings generalize to broader
measures of wealth. In Section 4.3, we therefore perform sensitivity checks to make
sure that our findings are robust to using measures of gross wealth (net worth),
defined as the sum of financial wealth and real estate (net of debt).8 This section
also presents results from other specification checks. We perform median regressions
which are less sensitive to extreme values. We find that e ect estimates on the
median are quite similar to those on the mean. We investigate the sensitivity of the
results to whether children’s financial wealth and their portfolio risk are measured
at the household or the individual level; the estimates do not di er appreciably. Our
baseline specification is based on household level measures, in part to incorporate
any e ect of family background that operates through assortative mating but also
to avoid making arbitrary splits across spouses of jointly owned assets.9
Our main analysis is based on parental financial wealth observed in 1993-1995
and children’s financial wealth observed in 2009-2011. By focusing on these years,
we get reliable and comparable measures of wealth for both the children and their
parents. At the same time, it means that the ages at which child and parental
not always updated regularly, which may create measurement error when converting tax values to
market values.
7The estimates do not change appreciably if we instead use yearly data on financial wealth.
8In constructing the measures of gross wealth and net worth, we follow the guidelines of the
Norwegian Tax Authorities and multiply the reported tax value of real estate by four.
9In Norway, married couples file separate income and wealth tax returns. However, total taxes
paid do generally not depend on how spouses split the values of jointly owned assets.
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wealth are measured vary across cohorts. In our baseline specification, we follow
Charles and Hurst (2003) and Boserup et al. (2013) in pooling the cohorts in our
estimation sample while flexibly controlling for age of children and parents at the
time at which their wealth is measured. This specification produces a weighted
average of potentially heterogeneous e ects across di erent ages. In Section 4.3,
we show that our main findings are robust to the age at which we measure child
and parental wealth. This section also addresses concerns over simultaneity bias
from measuring parental wealth after the adoptive parents observe the quality and
behavior of their adoptive children.
2.2 Sample selection and summary statistics
In most of our analysis, we study Korean-born children who were adopted by
Norwegian parents. We refine the sample of these Korean-Norwegian adoptees to
be appropriate for studying the role of family background in determining children’s
wealth accumulation and investor behavior as adults. We begin by restricting the
sample to children who were adopted at infancy (eighteen months or less). The
reason for this sample restriction is to capture as much as possible of the di erences
in early child environment across adoptive families. We further restrict the sample
to adoptees who were born between 1965 and 1986. This sample restriction allows
us to observe the adult outcomes and behavior for a sizable sample of adoptees.
Taken together, these restrictions give us a baseline sample of 2 265 Korean-
Norwegian adoptees. Table 1 displays summary statistics of the baseline sample,
while Figure 1 shows the distribution of financial wealth of adoptees. The adoptees
are between the ages of 25 and 46 in 2011; on average, the age is 32.8.10 The
adoptees are more likely to be female, and they have on average 15 years of schooling
and almost USD 100 000 in household income.11 Over the period 2009-2011, the
mean financial wealth is about USD 47 000, of which 12 percent is invested in risky
assets. Around two out of five adoptees participate in the stock market at least once
during these years.
In Table 1 and Figure 1, we also provide a comparison of the Korean-Norwegian
adoptees and the population of non-adoptees (children raised by their biological
parents) who were born between 1965 and 1986. The adoptees tend to be a few
years younger and they are more likely to be female. More importantly, the Korean-
Norwegian adoptees are fairly comparable to the non-adoptees in their distribution
10The lower age restriction is the same as in Charles and Hurst (2003). By comparison, Boserup
et al. (2013) include children who are at least 21 years of age.
11Throughout this paper, all monetary figures are in USD, 2011 prices. We have used the
following exchange rate: NOK/USD = 5.61.
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of wealth and their investor behavior. We can also see that adoptive parents have, on
average, higher income and financial wealth than parents who do not adopt. However,
these di erences are largely because the adoptive parents in our sample tend to be
somewhat older; as shown in Section 5.2, the socio-economic characteristics of the
adoptive parents are broadly similar to those of other parents once we condition on
their birth years.
Figure 1. Distribution of financial wealth for Korean-Norwegian adoptees and
Norwegian non-adoptees
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
5 9 13
Log Wealth
Adoptees Non−Adoptees
Notes: The figure plots kernel density estimates of the distribution of (log) financial wealth for the Norwegian
non-adoptees and the Korean-Norwegian adoptees (see Table 1 for further details).
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics of Korean-Norwegian adoptees and Norwegian
non-adoptees
Korean-Norwegian Norwegian
adoptees non-adoptees
Variable Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev
A. Children
Age, 2011 32.8 5.1 36.1 6.4
Gender 0.7 0.4 0.5 0.5
Years of schooling, 2011 15.0 2.9 14.1 3.0
Mean income, 2009-2011 98 927 75 699 113 736 76 649
Mean financial wealth, 2009-2011 47 156 104 412 54 873 118 030
Risky assets, 2009-2011:
Participation 0.421 0.494 0.465 0.499
Share 0.120 0.217 0.149 0.245
B. Parents
Mother’s, 2011:
Age 64.0 6.1 62.7 8.2
Years of schooling 12.7 2.6 12.0 2.6
Father’s, 2011:
Age 66.2 6.6 65.7 8.9
Years of schooling 13.3 3.0 12.5 3.0
Number of children 1.7 0.7 2.3 1.0
Mean income, 1993-1995 91 479 44 700 75 524 45 766
Mean financial wealth, 1993-1995 48 589 76 376 39 331 69 685
Risky assets, 1993-1995:
Participation 0.359 0.429 0.384 0.486
Share 0.139 0.228 0.118 0.219
Number of children 2 265 1 204 386
Notes: The Korean-Norwegian adoptees are born in South Korea between 1965 and 1986, and adopted at infancy
(not older than 18 months) by Norwegian parents. The non-adoptees are born in Norway between 1965 and 1986,
and raised by their biological parents. All monetary values are measured in USD, 2011 prices. Income and wealth
are measured at the household level. Risky assets are defined as the sum of mutual funds with a stock component
and directly held stocks. Risky share is measured as the proportion of the financial wealth invested in risky assets
over the three year period. Stock market participation is an indicator variable taking the value one if at least some
fraction of financial wealth is invested in risky assets over the three year period. Number of children of the parents
includes own-birth and adopted children.
Table 2 summarizes the dependence in wealth across generations by displaying
parents’ and children’s relative positions in the wealth distributions. Panel A
considers the non-adoptees, whereas panel B shows results for the Korean-Norwegian
adoptees. To adjust for age di erences, each panel is based on separate regressions
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of child and parent log financial wealth on a full set of indicators for birth years
of children and parents (and year of adoption for the adoptees); we then split the
residuals from these two regressions into five equal segments, and create parent-child
wealth transition matrices. Each element of the matrix shows the probability that a
child belongs to the a ith quintile of the distribution for children, given that her
parents belong to the jth quintile of the parental distribution. The more independent
children’s and parents’ wealth are, the greater the likelihood that the elements of
this transition matrix should be close to one-fifth.
Table 2. Intergenerational transition matrix of age-adjusted wealth position
A. Norwegian non-adoptees: Parental age-adjusted
wealth quintile (1993-1995)Child age-adjusted
wealth quintile (2009-2011) 1 2 3 4 5
1 36 24 18 13 9
2 24 23 21 18 13
3 17 21 22 22 18
4 13 18 21 24 24
5 10 14 18 23 36
Total 100 100 100 100 100
B. Korean-Norwegian adoptees Parental age-adjusted
wealth quintile (1993-1995)Child age-adjusted
wealth quintile (2009-2011) 1 2 3 4 5
1 27 19 20 20 15
2 24 19 19 19 18
3 19 22 23 19 17
4 15 23 21 21 20
5 15 17 17 21 30
Total 100 100 100 100 100
Notes: The table displays transmission matrices for wealth quintiles of two di erent samples of parents and children:
Norwegian non-adoptees (N=1 204 386) and Korean-Norwegian adoptees (N=2 265). See Table 1 for further details.
To adjust for age di erences, each panel is based on separate regressions of child and parental log financial wealth
on a full set of indicators for birth years of children and parents (and year of adoption for the adoptees).
Panel A shows substantial persistence in wealth position from parents to non-
adopted children. For instance, 36 percent of parents in the lowest age-adjusted
wealth quintile have children whose wealth places them in that same quintile in
the children’s adjusted wealth distribution. Only 9 percent of parents in the
highest quintile have children whose wealth places in the lowest quintile in the child
distribution. Similar persistence is evident at the other tail of the parental wealth
distribution. Interestingly, Charles and Hurst (2003) find very similar persistence in
wealth position from American parents to children.
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Panel B suggests lower but still considerable persistence in the wealth position
from adoptive parents to adopted children. 27 percent of adoptive parents in the
lowest age-adjusted wealth quintile have adoptive children whose wealth places them
in that same quintile in the children’s adjusted wealth distribution. 15 percent of
adoptive parents in the highest quintile have adoptive children whose wealth places
in the lowest quintile in the child distribution. Similar persistence is evident at
the other tail of the adoptive parents’ wealth distribution. Taken together, the
two panels in Table 2 point to the presence of intergenerational links in wealth
accumulation, even after removing the genetic connection between children and
the parents raising them. Indeed, a likelihood ratio chi-squared test confirms the
persistence evident in the table: In each panel, we can strongly reject the hypothesis
that the entries in the wealth position transition matrix are equal to each other
(p-value < 0.001).
3 Assignment of adoptees to families
This section documents how the Korean born adoptees were assigned to Norwegian
families.
3.1 Assignment process
Between 1965 and 1986, a large number of South Korean children were adopted
into Norwegian families, making Korean-born children the largest group of foreign
adoptees in Norway. The majority of Korean-born children sent for adoption were
born to lower- or middle-class unwed mothers.
During the period we consider, virtually all the Korean-Norwegian adoptees were
handled through the organization called Children of the World, Norway (CNW).
This organization has its origin in the Norwegian Korean Association, which was
founded in 1953 by personnel at the Norwegian field hospital stationed in South
Korea during the Korean War. In the 50s and early 60s, CNW conveyed contact
between Norwegians who wanted to adopt children and Korean institutions that
arranged adoption to foreign countries. In the 1960s, the organization was granted
a unique license for adoption arrangement from South Korea to Norway and started
its cooperation with Holt International Children’s Services in Korea.
The process of adoption from South Korea to Norway consisted of several steps.12
12Our description of the process is based on written documentation from CNW and interviews
with its employees. See Sacerdote (2007) for a discussion of a similar assignment process of
Korean-born children to American families.
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The first step was the submission of an application to CNW for review by case
examiners. Adoptive parents had to meet several pre-specified criteria, including
being married for three years or longer, an age di erence between the spouses of
less than ten years, and a minimum family income. At the time of application, the
adoptive parents also had to be between the ages of 25 and 40, and have no more
than 4 children. If the applicant satisfied these formal criteria, a case examiner met
the adoptive parents to talk about their personal history and family relationships.
This home study had to be approved before a family was qualified to adopt. The
entire review process usually took about one year.
The next step in the adoption process was that CNW sent the approved files to
Holt Korea, which assigned children in its system to the adoptive families in the order
the applications arrived, without other biases or preferences. This first come, first
served policy meant that precisely which adoptee that was assigned to which family
depended on the order the application arrived rather than the characteristics of the
child or the adoptive parents. As a result, assignment of children to pre-approved
adoptive families should be e ectively random conditional on the time of adoption.
Importantly, adoptive parents could not specify the gender, age or anything else
about the child they wanted to adopt.
3.2 Verifying quasi-random assignment
Table 3 verifies that the queuing policy created a setting where assignment to
adoptive families is as good as random conditional on time of adoption. This table
conducts the same type of statistical tests that would be done for a randomized
controlled trial to verify compliance with randomization. We regress pre-assignment
characteristics of the adoptee on pre-assignment characteristics of the adoptive
family. Each column is a separate regression. The dependent variables are the
adoptee’s age at adoption and gender.13 These are important characteristics to test
for selective placements, as many countries other than South Korea allowed adopting
parents to choose or request the age and gender of their child.
The first and fourth column of Table 3 use the same family background char-
acteristics as Sacerdote (2007) in his randomization test: the log of family income,
father’s years of schooling, mother’s years of schooling, and log median income in
the county of residence in childhood. The other columns add key regressors for
parent’s financial wealth and investor behavior. In the second and fifth column, we
measure parental financial wealth in 1993-1995; in the third and sixth column we
13Sacerdote (2007) also have information about the Korean adoptee’s weight and height upon
entering the Holt system. His results show that the queuing policy of the Holt system generates no
correlation between these variables and the pre-assignment characteristics of the adoptive family.
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measure parental gross wealth around the time of adoption. All regressions include
dummies for calendar year of adoption and birth cohort. None of the family back-
ground characteristics are statistically significant predictors (at the 5 % significance
level) of adoptee’s age or gender. In fact, the point estimates are small, and taken
together, the family characteristics explain very little of the variation in the adoptee
characteristics.
To assess the power of the randomization test, we have run the same regressions
for native-born children who were adopted by Norwegian families. These domestic
adoptions were not assigned through a queuing policy, and many of them occur
between related family members. Selective placement can also occur between
unrelated individuals because adoptive parents could request children with certain
characteristics or because the adoption agencies used information about the adoptees
(or their biological parents) to assign children to adoptive families. Indeed, the
regression results show significant correlations between adoptive parents’ education
and family income and the adoptee characteristics. The evidence of significant
non-random assignment is not driven by larger a sample size, as there are a similar
number of native-born adoptees and Korean born adoptees.
4 Empirical analysis
This section presents our research design, describes our main findings, and discusses
their robustness.
4.1 Research design and parameters of interest
We use the quasi-random assignment of Korean adoptees to estimate the causal
e ects from a child being raised in one type of family versus another. In our main
analysis, we take the baseline sample of Korean-Norwegian adoptees and run OLS
regressions of the model:
y = xÕ— + wÕ◊ + ‘ (1)
where y denotes the adult outcome of the adoptee, x is a vector of observable
characteristics of his adoptive family, and w is a vector of controls, including a full
set of indicators for calendar year of adoption and the birth year of both the adoptee
and his adoptive parents.
Our interest is centered on estimating —, giving the e ect of being raised in
di erent types of families as described by their observables x. We will be estimating
several specifications of equation (1). To fix ideas, consider a simple specification in
which y is measuring the (log of) financial wealth of the child and x includes only the
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(log of) financial wealth of the adoptive family. Due to the quasi-random assignment,
— is a child-parent wealth elasticity that can be interpreted as a weighted average of
the causal e ects of being raised by parents with higher wealth. Figure 2 illustrates
the variation in our data that we use use to estimate —, graphing the adoptee’s
wealth as adult by the wealth of the adoptive family they happened to be assigned
to. This figure displays the residuals from separate regression of child and parent
log financial wealth on a full set of indicators for year of adoption and birth years of
children and parents. The graphical evidence suggests that being raised by wealthy
parents tend to make the child wealthier as an adult.
Figure 2. Association between adoptee’s (log) wealth and adoptive parents’ (log)
wealth
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5
7
7.
5
8
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g) 
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Parental (log) wealth
Notes: The figure displays the relationship between log child wealth and log parental wealth in the sample of Korean-
Norwegian adoptees (N=2 265). We plot the residuals from separate regressions of child and parental log financial
wealth on a full set of indicators for birth years of children and parents and year of adoption for the adoptees.
The size of the circle represents the number of children within each bin. The slope is 0.0854, corresponding to the
estimate in the first column of the first panel of Table 4.
In a simple OLS regression of child wealth on parent wealth, the estimate of
— will capture any e ect which operates through assignment to wealthier parents,
including direct transfers of wealth, parental investments in children’s human capital,
or learning of attitudes and traits. To help understand the mechanisms underlying
the e ects of being raised by wealthier parents, we can add family characteristics
other than wealth to x. For instance, we will examine how the child-parent wealth
elasticity change when we control for parent’s financial risk taking, education and
household income and children’s sibship size and place of residence in childhood. By
changing the dependent variable in equation (1), we can also examine how family
background a ects outcomes other than wealth accumulation. For example, we will
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consider how being raised in one type of family versus another a ect children’s stock
market participation and portfolio risk as adults.
4.2 Main results
Table 4 presents intergenerational associations in wealth accumulation and investor
behavior. Each column reports estimates from equation (1), including a full set of
indicators for year of adoption and birth years of the adoptees and their adoptive
parents. The first three columns present the associations between the adoptive par-
ents and their Korean-Norwegian adoptive children, removing the genetic connection
between children and the parents raising them. The last column presents the associ-
ations between these adoptive parents and their own-birth children, maintaining the
genetic link between children and the parents raising them.
The first panel of Table 4 presents intergenerational links in wealth accumulation,
regressing the (log of) financial wealth of the adoptee on the (log of) financial wealth
of the adoptive family. In the first column, we find an age-adjusted intergenerational
wealth elasticity of .085, implying that adoptees raised by parents with a wealth
level that is 10 percent above the mean of the parent generation can expect to obtain
a wealth level that is almost 1 percent above the mean of the child generation. The
second and third column investigate whether the association between parent and
child wealth is not really due to wealth per se, but to the e ect of parent’s stock
market participation and portfolio risk. Our estimates show that if we control for
these variables, the child-parent wealth elasticity falls but not by a lot. Holding
parental wealth constant, it is also clear that adoptees tend to be wealthier if they
were raised by parents who invested a larger proportion of the financial wealth in
risky assets.
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Table 4. Intergenerational links in wealth and investor behavior
Korean-Norwegian Non-adopted
adoptees siblings
A. Dep. variable:
Child (log) financial wealth
Parental:
(log) financial wealth 0.0854 0.0711 0.0690 0.1238
(0.0179)*** (0.0188)*** (0.0186)*** (0.0327)***
participation -0.0666 -0.0651 0.1258
(0.1039) (0.1034) (0.1935)
risky share 0.5911 0.6092 0.3311
(0.2285)*** (0.2274)*** (0.3729)
B. Dep. variable:
Child participation
Parental:
(log) financial wealth 0.0155 0.0069 0.0069 0.0081
(0.0051)*** (0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0131)
participation 0.0455 0.0454 0.1212
(0.0293) (0.0293) (0.0640)*
risky share 0.1289 0.1299 0.0739
(0.0627)** (0.0626)** (0.1264)
C. Dep. variable:
Child risky share
Parental:
(log) financial wealth 0.0079 0.0035 0.0035 0.0072
(0.0024)*** (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0063)
participation 0.0019 0.0015 0.0230
(0.0138) (0.0138) (0.0354)
risky share 0.1241 0.1250 0.1228
(0.0377)*** (0.0376)*** (0.0732)*
Additional controls:
Gender and age at adoption
Number of children 2 265 630
Notes: Every column of each panel is a separate regressions of children’s outcomes as adults on family back-
ground variables and a full set of indicators for birth years of children and parents (and year of adoption for the
Korean-Norwegian adoptees). Columns 1-3 use the sample of Korean-Norwegian adoptees (see Table 1 for further
details), while column 4 considers the non-adopted siblings of the Korean-Norwegian adoptees. Standard errors (in
parentheses) are clustered at the mother. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.
The second and third panel turn to intergenerational links in investor behavior,
as measured by stock market participation and the proportion of financial wealth
invested in risky assets. The first column shows that adoptees’ stock market
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participation and risky share are increasing in adoptive parents’ wealth. However,
these associations are relatively weak, and as evident from the second column, other
aspects of family background play a significant role for children’s asset allocation and
the riskiness of chosen portfolios. In particular, an adoptee’s financial risk taking
is increasing significantly in the proportion of financial wealth that their adoptive
parents invested in risky assets.
To help interpret the magnitude of the intergenerational causal links in wealth
accumulation and investor behavior, the fourth column reports the intergenerational
associations for the non-adopted siblings. This enables us to compare the predictive
influence of family background when there is and is not a genetic link between
children and the parents raising them. We find that wealth shows less transmission
from parents to adoptees (elasticity of .069) as compared to non-adoptees (elasticity
of .124), whereas the magnitude of parental transmission of financial risk taking (as
measured by risky share) does not depend on a genetic connection to the child.
Since the variables in Table 4 are measured in di erent units, it is di cult to
directly compare the magnitude of the coe cients. In Figures 3 and 4, we assess the
relative importance of the di erent aspects of family background for the adoptees.
These figures point to the importance of parental wealth for children’s accumulation
of wealth, and indicate that children’s financial decision making is relatively strongly
a ected by parents’ financial risk taking.
Figure 3 displays standardized coe cients for the regression models of column 3
in Table 4. Each variable (outcomes and regressors) is standardized by subtracting
its mean from each of its values and then dividing these new values by the standard
deviation of the variable. The standardized coe cients show how many standard
deviations the outcome variable of the child is expected to change, per standard
deviation change in the characteristic of the parents. We find that a one standard
deviation change in parental wealth produces more of a change in children’s wealth
levels than a one standard deviation change in parental risky share or stock market
participation. By comparison, a one standard deviation change in parental risky
share is estimated to have a stronger impact on children’s financial risk taking as
compared to a one standard deviation change in parental wealth or stock market
participation.
Figure 4 complements by comparing the explanatory power of parental financial
wealth, stock market participation, and risky share from the regressions reported
in column 3 of Table 4; we normalize the partial R-squared values to sum to one,
so the reported values can be directly interpreted as the fraction of the explained
variability that is attributable to an observable aspect of family background. We
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find that parental wealth is most important in explaining the variation in adoptees’
accumulation of wealth. By comparison, parents’ risky share accounts for most of
the explained variability in the financial decision making of the adoptees.
Figure 3. Standardized regression coe cients
Stand. coef.
of parental:
−.05 0 .05 .1 .15
Standard deviation change in children’s (log) financial wealth
risky share
participation
(log) financial wealth
Stand. coef.
of parental:
−.05 0 .05 .1 .15
Standard deviation change in children’s stock market participation
risky share
participation
(log) financial wealth
Stand. coef.
of parental:
−.05 0 .05 .1 .15
Standard deviation change in children’s risky share
risky share
participation
(log) financial wealth
Notes: This figure displays standardized coe cients for the three regression models of column 3 in Table 4, where
both outcome variables and regressors are standardized with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. Each
bar shows how many standard deviations the outcome variable of the child is expected to change, per standard
deviation change in the characteristic of the parents (holding the other regressors fixed).
4.3 Specification checks
Before turning to the interpretation of our findings, we present results from several
specification checks, all of which are reported in Appendix B.
To address concerns about measurement error, Table 4 focused on financial
wealth. A natural question is whether the child-parent elasticity in financial wealth
generalizes to other measures of wealth. In Appendix Table B.2, we perform
sensitivity checks to using measures of gross wealth (net worth), defined as the
sum of financial wealth and real estate (net of debt). Columns 1-3 show that the
child-parent wealth elasticity changes little if we use measures of gross wealth instead
of financial wealth. In column 4, we find a significant association between the net
worth of children and parents. While financial and gross wealth are positive for all
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Figure 4. Fraction of explained variability in children’s outcomes that is attributable
to specific parental characteristics
Parental characteristic:
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Fraction of explained variability in children’s (log) financial wealth
risky share
participation
(log) financial wealth
Parental characteristic:
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Fraction of explained variability in children’s stock market participation
risky share
participation
(log) financial wealth
Parental characteristic:
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Fraction of explained variability in children’s risky share
risky share
participation
(log) financial wealth
Notes: This figure displays the partial R-squared for the regressors parental financial wealth, parental participation,
and parental risky share, based on the three regression models of column 3 in Table 4. For each outcome variable,
we normalize the partial R-squared values to sum to one. Each bar shows the fraction of explained variability in
the outcome that is attributable to a specific parental characteristic (holding the other regressors fixed).
households, net worth is sometimes negative. Instead of taking logs, we therefore
used a linear specification in net worth. However, when comparing the estimates in
columns 1 and 4, it is clear that the marginal e ect on child wealth of another dollar
of parental wealth is robust to whether we use measures of net worth (marginal
e ect of .0801) or financial wealth (marginal e ect of .069).
Appendix Table B.2 also presents results from other specification checks. Column
5 performs a median regression which is less sensitive to extreme values. We estimate
that e ects on the median are significant and somewhat larger than those on the
mean. In columns 6-7, we show that our estimates barely move if we measure parental
wealth around the time of adoption instead of in 1993 -1995. This specification also
addresses potential concerns of simultaneity bias from measuring parental wealth
after the adoptive parents observe the quality and behavior of their adoptive children.
In the estimates of Table 4, the ages at which children’s wealth are measured
vary across cohorts. Appendix Figure B.1 complements these results by estimating
the child-parent wealth elasticity separately for adoptees of di erent age. In each
age group, the elasticity is significant and it ranges from .06 among the youngest
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children (25-30) to .10 among the oldest children (37-46). Appendix Figure B.1 also
presents age-specific estimates of the child-parent wealth elasticity for non-adoptees.
The age profile of the non-adoptees mirrors closely the age profile of the adoptees,
suggesting that comparisons across the two groups in parental transmission of wealth
do not hinge on the age at which child wealth is measured.
Our last set of specification checks examine the sensitivity of the results to
whether children’s financial wealth and their stock market participation and risky
share are measured at the household or the individual level. As shown in Appendix
Table B.3, the intergenerational links in wealth and investor behavior do not di er
appreciably depending on whether we use measures of individual versus household
wealth.
5 Interpretation of results
This section explores mechanisms, examines the generalizability of the lessons from
adoptees, and compares our findings to results from behavioral genetics decomposi-
tions.
5.1 Possible mechanisms
Standard models of wealth accumulation suggest that wealth levels depend on
individuals’ income profiles, their propensity to save and choice of investment
portfolio, and the amount and timing of gifts and bequests. These models point
to several reasons why parent and child wealth would be similar, even after after
removing the genetic connection between children and the parents raising them:
Wealthy parents may invest more in children’s human capital, raising their income
levels or shifting their income trajectories; wealthy parents may directly transfer
wealth, inter vivos or through inheritance; and wealthy parents may shape the
attitudes or traits that influence children’s savings propensity or portfolio choices.
To investigate the relative importance of these channels, we add controls to equation
(1). To the extent that these controls lower the estimates of —, we can say they
account for the influence of parental wealth or investor behavior.
24
Table 5. Determinants of intergenerational links
Dep. variable: Child (log) financial wealth
Parental:
(log) financial wealth 0.0690 0.0685 0.0597 0.0587
(0.0186)*** (0.0183)*** (0.0175)*** (0.0159)***
participation -0.0651 -0.0566 -0.0736 -0.0363
(0.1034) (0.1054) (0.1045) (0.0980)
risky share 0.6092 0.6009 0.4970 0.4432
(0.2274)*** (0.2285)*** (0.2232)** (0.2100)**
Dep. variable: Child participation
Parental:
(log) financial wealth 0.0069 0.0079 0.0077 0.0081
(0.0052) (0.0053) (0.0053) (0.0054)
participation 0.0454 0.0513 0.0508 0.0561
(0.0293) (0.0296)* (0.0297)* (0.0285)**
risky share 0.1299 0.1329 0.1304 0.1227
(0.0626)** (0.0631)** (0.0633)** (0.0614)**
Dep. variable: Child risky share
Parental:
(log) financial wealth 0.0035 0.0042 0.0036 0.0038
(0.0022) (0.0022)* (0.0022) (0.0023)*
participation 0.0015 0.0046 0.0032 0.0043
(0.0138) (0.0139) (0.0138) (0.0137)
risky share 0.1250 0.1247 0.1174 0.1160
(0.0376)*** (0.0375)*** (0.0371)*** (0.0370)***
Additional controls:
Gender and age at adoption
Parental education, family income,
# of siblings, and childhood region
Direct wealth transfers
Child education, income,
and financial literacy
Notes: Every column of each panel uses the sample of 2 265 Korean-Norwegian adoptees (see Table 1 for further
details) to estimate separate regressions of children’s outcomes as adults on family background variables and a full
set of indicators for birth years of children and parents and year of adoption. Standard errors (in parentheses) are
clustered at the mother. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.
The first column of Table 5 repeats the baseline estimates from column three
of Table 4. The second column of Table 5 adds a range of controls for other
observable characteristics of the childhood rearing environment. We include controls
for parental income and education, as a large literature documents that these
variables are correlated between parents and their children; we control for number of
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siblings (at time of adoption), so that we only exploit the variation within families of a
given size; and we condition on children’s place of residence in childhood, accounting
for determinants of wealth that are fixed at the region level. Our estimates suggest
the e ect of being raised by wealthier parents is not operating through parents’
education and household income or children’s sibship size and place of residence in
childhood. It is also evident that the intergenerational links in investor behavior
cannot be accounted for by these variables.
In the two last columns of Table 5, we condition on child variables that are
expected to determine wealth accumulation and financial risk taking, including
direct transfers of wealth, children’s education and income, and a proxy for their
financial literacy. Since these variables may be directly a ected by parent’s wealth
and investor behavior, we are reluctant to giving the regression results a strict causal
interpretation. Instead, we think of them as describing how the predictive influence
of parental wealth and investor behavior change when we hold constant certain
determinants of children’s wealth accumulation and financial risk taking.
Using population level data from 1995-2011, we construct measures of direct
transfers of wealth over this time period. In each year, we observe both gifts and
bequests (in cash or in kind) from friends, parents and other family members.14 Our
measures of gifts and bequests include any transfer to an individual, either directly
or indirectly, where full consideration (measured in money or money’s worth) is
not received in return. The general rule is that both the donor and the recipient
must report any gift or bequest to the tax administration (even in cases where it is
not taxable).15 Child education is measured as years of schooling, child income is
measured as the average over the years 2009-2011, and we proxy financial literacy
with a dummy variable for whether the child has a college degree in finance, business
or economics.
The estimates reported in column 3 suggest the predictive influence of parental
wealth and investor behavior are not driven primarily by gifts or bequests. When
controlling for direct transfers of wealth, the child-parent wealth elasticity falls but
not by a lot, and the similarity in investor behavior between parents and children
do not change appreciably. Column 4 adds controls for children’s education, income
14Norwegian law states that in kind transfers are counted at the full fair market value, which
is the price at which the property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing
seller. The law also limits the possibilities of parents to di erentiate between children (own-birth
or adopted) through bequests, as only a certain fraction can be transferred according to parents’
preferences. The remainder is reserved for equal sharing between children. The same regulations
apply to gifts that are advancements of inheritance.
15There are exceptions to this rule. For instance, individuals do not have to report gifts or
bequests if their value, in total, do not exceed a relatively low annual threshold.
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and the proxy for financial literacy. The estimates barely move when we control for
these variables, suggesting that they do not account for the influence of parental
wealth or investor behavior.
In interpreting these results, however, it is important to recognize that wealth
transfers could be more important in other samples where fewer parents are still alive,
but at least this channel does not seem to explain our estimates which are informative
about intergenerational links over the majority of children’s lives. Because we cannot
follow children over an even longer period of time, we are prevented from measuring
pre- and post-inheritance wealth levels of all children. The same data limitations
apply to Charles and Hurst (2003) and Boserup et al. (2013). By comparison,
Adermon, Lindahl, and Waldenstrom (2015) use historical data from Sweden on
child and parental wealth when they are alive (wealth tax returns) and at death
(estate records), and find suggestive evidence of the wealth transmission being lower
when measuring wealth at death than during the lifetime.
Taken together, Table 5 provides suggestive evidence that being raised in one
type of family versus another creates heterogeneity in wealth and portfolio choices
even among individuals with similar economic resources. One way to interpret this
finding is that two individuals facing similar budget sets might make very di erent
decisions to save and invest depending of childhood rearing environment. This
interpretation points to the importance of other factors that are unobservable to
us, but matter for wealth accumulation and investor behavior, such as attitudes to
savings or risk taking that adoptive parents may transmit to their adoptive children.
Consistent with such a mechanism, Sacerdote (2007) finds that adoptees’ risky
behavior are sensitive to the family in which they are raised.
Motivated by these results, we examine the role of family background in deter-
mining risky behavior in contexts other than financial decision making, including
car driving (proxied by speeding tickets) and sectoral choice (private versus public
sector).16 Our information on speeding tickets come from police records covering all
automated speeding cameras over the years 1995-2011. The data on sectoral choice
comes from employer-employee registers for the period 1995-2011. In Norway, there
is much more churning and wage variability in private sector firms as compared to
the public sector. When looking at these measures of (or proxies for) risky taking,
16Looking at these contexts is motivated by previous research and data availability. Bonin,
Dohmen, Falk, Hu man, and Sunde (2007) use survey data to show that individuals who are willing
to take more risk tend to sort into occupations with higher cross-sectional earnings variability.
Dohmen, Falk, Hu man, Sunde, Schupp, and Wagner (2011) show that survey measures of risky
attitudes are strong predictors of financial risk taking and sectoral choice. Grinblatt and Keloharju
(2009) document a strong correlation between individuals’ financial risk taking and the chance
they earn a speeding ticket.
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we use the same sample and model specification as in columns 1 and 4 of Table 5,
except the outcome variables are di erent. In Appendix Table B.4, the outcome
variable is an indicator variable for whether the child earned a speeding ticket. The
outcome variable in Appendix Table B.5 is an indicator variable that is equal to one
if the child worked in the public sector.
We find that parental financial risk taking (as measured by risky share) reduces
the likelihood the adoptee is working in the public sector and increases the chance
of earning a speeding ticket. The estimated e ects are significant at conventional
levels and robust to controlling for parents’ education and household income as
well as children’s sibship size, place of residence in childhood, education, income
and financial literacy. On top of this, the estimates do not change appreciably if
we control for parental sectoral choice or whether the parents received a speeding
ticket. Additionally, the e ect on earning a speeding ticket become stronger if we
restrict attention to the subsample of adoptees who own a car.17 Taken together,
these results suggest being raised by parents who take more financial risk makes
the adoptees engage in more risky behavior also in contexts other than financial
decision making.
5.2 External validity
The quasi-random assignment of adoptees to pre-approved adoptive families pro-
vides a unique opportunity to identify the e ects of large scale changes in family
environment on children’s outcomes. At the same time, the specificity of the setting
raises questions about whether the e ects we identify are unique to adoptive parents
and their adopted children, or if they are likely to generalize to a larger population
of parents and children. As discussed in Holmlund et al. (2011), there are three
possible reasons why the external validity of adoption results may be limited: Adop-
tive parents may be di erent from other parents; adoptive parents may treat their
children di erently; and adoptees may be di erent from other children. Using the
rich Norwegian data, we try to infer whether any of these di erences are empirically
important in our setting with Korean-born children who were adopted at infancy.
A natural first step is to compare adoptive parents and their adopted children to
other parents and children. As documented in Table 1 and Figure 1, the outcomes
and characteristics of the Korean-Norwegian adoptees are broadly similar to that of
other children. However, the adoptive parents tend to have somewhat higher income
17One might be concerned that parental financial risk taking is correlated with the likelihood
of owning a car. However, we find no evidence of significant correlations between these variables,
suggesting that endogenous selection into the subsample of column 4 in Tables B.4 is not a major
concern.
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and financial wealth than parents who do not adopt. However, these di erences are
to a large extent because the adoptive parents in our sample tend to be somewhat
older than the parents of the non-adoptees. As shown in Appendix Table B.6, the
socio-economic characteristics of the adoptive parents are quite comparable to those
of other parents once we condition on their year birth years. Indeed, the Korean-
Norwegian adoptees become even more similar to the non-adoptees if we adjust for
di erences that are attributable to birth years of parents and child (see Appendix
Table B.7). By way of comparison, native-born adoptees and their adoptive parents
are much less comparable to other parents and children, as shown in the final column
of Appendix Tables B.6 and B.7.
Another check of whether adoptive parents di er in important ways from other
parents is to compare intergenerational OLS estimates based on parents and own-
birth children raised in families with and without Korean born adoptees. For
example, if adoptive parents invest (or transfer) more resources in their children, we
would expect parental transmission of wealth to be stronger for own-birth children
with an adopted sibling as compared to own-birth children without an adopted
sibling. The first (second) row of panel A in Table 6 presents OLS estimates of the
child-parent wealth elasticity for the sample without (with) an adopted sibling. The
strong similarity in the child-parent wealth elasticity suggests that adoptive parents
do not di er significantly from other parents when it comes to wealth transmission
to own-birth children. The last two panels of Table 6 complement by comparing
intergenerational OLS estimates based on adoptees with and without a non-adopted
sibling. This comparison is motivated by the possibility that parental investments
in adoptees may depend on whether or not they have own-birth children. For
instance, adoptive parents might favor own-birth children, shifting resources away
from adoptive children and towards biological children. However, the child-parent
wealth elasticity do not di er appreciably depending on whether the adoptee has an
adopted or non-adopted sibling.
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Table 6. OLS estimates of child-parent wealth elasticity in di erent types of families
Child-parent wealth elasticity
A. Own birth children
With non-adopted sibling 0.1773 0.1482 0.1315
(N=968 924) (0.0014)*** (0.0014)*** (0.0014)***
With adopted sibling 0.1531 0.1329 0.1239
(N=630) (0.0320)*** (0.0333)*** (0.0328)***
B. Adopted children
With non-adopted sibling 0.1114 0.1141 0.1135
(N=464) (0.0293)*** (0.0329)*** (0.0324)***
With adopted sibling 0.1150 0.0950 0.1057
(N=801) (0.0331)*** (0.0345)*** (0.0332)***
Additional controls:
Parental participation and risky share
Gender and age at adoption
Parental education, family income,
# of siblings, and childhood region
Notes: Every column of each panel is a separate regressions of child (log) financial wealth on parental (log) financial
wealth and a full set of indicators for birth years of children and parents (and year of adoption for the adoptees).
Columns 2 adds controls for parental participation and risky share, and column 3 adds controls for parental
education and family income and children’s gender, sibship size and place of residence in childhood (and age at
adoption for the adoptees). Panel A presents OLS estimates based on parents and own-birth children raises in
families i) with a non-adopted sibling but no adopted sibling, or ii) with a Korean born adopted sibling. Panel
B presents OLS estimates based on parents and the Korean-Norwegian adoptees raised in families i) with a non-
adopted sibling but no adopted sibling, or ii) with a Korean-born adopted sibling. Standard errors (in parentheses)
are clustered at the mother. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.
5.3 Behavioral genetics decomposition
To directly compare what we find to previous evidence, this section provides an
interpretation of our data on the Korean-Norwegian adoptees through the lens of
a behavioral genetics decomposition. Our analysis follows much of the previous
literature in applying a restrictive but commonly used ACE model, which decomposes
child outcome into a linear and additive combination of genetic factors, shared
family environment, and unexplained factors.18 We refer to Appendix A for details
about the ACE model that we use. Table 7 presents the decomposition results for
children’s wealth accumulation and investor behavior as adults. To compare with
and benchmark to our decomposition results, this table also presents results for an
outcome (education) used in existing adoption studies.
18Appendix Table B.8 supplements the estimates from the standard ACE model by conditioning
on parents’ education and household income and children’s sibship size and place of residence in
childhood. The estimates do not change appreciably.
30
In the ACE model, the contribution of shared family environment depends on
how much adoptive and non-adoptive siblings resemble each other. The first row of
Table 7 shows significant correlations in financial wealth, stock market participation,
risky share and years of schooling across adoptees from Korea and their siblings
(i.e. sibling pairs with one Korean-Norwegian adoptee and one non-adoptee). The
fourth row of Table 7 translates the sibling correlations into ACE estimates of the
contribution from shared family environment. The results suggest that shared family
environment explains a fairly similar portion of the variation in wealth accumulation,
stock market participation and human capital acquisition, accounting for about 10
to 12.5 percent of the variation in these outcomes. By comparison, nearly 21 percent
of the variation in risky share can be accounted for by shared family environment.
The contribution of genetic factors depends on how much more biological siblings
(i.e. two non-adopted siblings) resemble each other relative to adoptive siblings (i.e.
one Korean-Norwegian adoptee and one non-adoptee). By comparing the first and
second row of Table 7, we can see that biological siblings have considerably stronger
correlations in financial wealth and education than adoptive siblings. The correlation
in stock market participation is twice as large for biological siblings as compared
to adoptees from Korea and their siblings, whereas the correlation in risky share
does not get stronger with a genetic connection between the siblings. As shown in
the third row of Table 7, the ACE model interprets these correlations as suggesting
that genetic factors explain a bigger portion of the variation in wealth accumulation
and human capital acquisition than in stock market participation, and that genes
account for little if anything of the variation in risky share. These findings are
consistent with the results in Table 4, showing less wealth transmission from parents
to adoptees as compared to non-adoptees and that parental transmission of financial
risk taking does not depend on a genetic connection to the child.
In terms of relative contribution of genetic factors and shared family environment,
the ACE model suggests that family environment is more importance than genes in
explaining the variation in children’s financial risk taking as measured by risky share.
When looking at wealth accumulation and educational levels, genetic factors account
for much more of the variation across children than shared family environment. By
way of comparison, the results on education are close to the American study of
Korean adoptees by Sacerdote (2007), who finds that 9 percent of the variation
in years of schooling can be explained by shared environment while 60 percent is
attributable to genes.
How do the decomposition results reported in Table 7 compare to existing
research? Much of the recent evidence on the determinants of individuals’ investor
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and savings behavior comes from ACE models based on identical and fraternal twins
(see Cesarini et al., 2010; Barnea et al., 2010; Cronqvist and Siegel, 2015). The
results from these studies point to a substantial genetic component, while shared
family environment seems to play little if any role. For example, Barnea et al. (2010)
use Swedish data on twins and find that genetic factors explain about 28 percent of
the variation in stock market participation and risky share; the contribution from
shared environmental factors is estimated to be close to zero for these measures of
investor behavior.
What can explain the di erences between our ACE results from adoption data
and the recent evidence from twin studies?19 Sacerdote (2010) discusses one possible
explanation: A key assumption of the standard ACE model is that sibling pairs raised
by the same parents have the same correlation in family or common environment.
As a consequence, any factors that make outcomes for identical twins more similar
than outcomes for fraternal twins are attributed to genetic factors. If identical
twins face more similar environment, the model overestimates the genetic e ects and
understates the importance of shared family environment. For instance, parents or
teachers may be more likely to expect or demand similar behavior from siblings who
are identical twins; or identical twins may interact or a ect each other’s environment
more than fraternal twins.
A few recent studies lend support to the concern that ACE estimates based on
twins may overestimate the genetic pre-determination of individual behavior at the
expense of family environment. Calvet and Sodini (2014) find that communication
and social interactions between twins have a strong influence on estimates of the
genetic component of financial risk taking. Further, Barnea et al. (2010) show that
the genetic component is significantly lower in the sample of identical twins that
communicate less frequently. Björklund, Jäntti, and Solon (2005) find that allowing
di erent types of sibling pairs to have di erent amounts of correlation in family
environment greatly lowers the estimated genetic e ect and raises the estimated
impact of family environment.
6 Conclusion
This paper provides novel evidence on intergenerational links in wealth accumula-
19The disconnect between the twin and adoption literature is not specific to financial decision
making. Sacerdote (2010) reviews the literatures, showing systematic di erences regarding the
importance of family environment and genes for several outcomes.
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tion and investor behavior in a setting where we can credibly control for genetic
transmission of abilities and preferences. The key to our research design is that we
can link Korean-born children who were adopted at infancy by Norwegian parents to
a population panel data set with detailed information on disaggregated wealth port-
folios and socio-economic characteristics. The mechanism by which these adoptees
were assigned to adoptive families is known and e ectively random. We use the
quasi-random assignment to estimate the causal e ects from an adoptee being raised
in one type of family versus another.
We find that family background matters significantly for children’s accumulation
of wealth and investor behavior as adults, even when removing the genetic connection
between children and the parents raising them. In particular, adoptees raised by
wealthy parents are more likely to be well o  themselves, whereas adoptees’ stock
market participation and portfolio risk are increasing in the financial risk taking
of their adoptive parents. These intergenerational causal links are not driven
primarily by inter vivos transfers or bequests. Instead, we find suggestive evidence
that di erences in childhood rearing environment create wealth inequality, in part,
by shaping the savings behaviors of individuals with similar economic resources.
However, it is important to emphasize that our estimates come from a sample in
which many parents are still alive, and direct wealth transfers could play a more
important role when children reach their 50s or 60s. Evidence from other settings or
populations would be useful to assess the generalizability of our findings.
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A Appendix
A. ACE model
Our description of the ACE model draws on Sacerdote (2007; 2010) and Cesarini,
Johannesson, Lichtenstein, Sandewall, and Wallace (2010). We consider an ACE
model in which child outcome (Y ) is produced by a linear and additive combination
of genetic factors (A), shared family environment (C) and unexplained factors (E):
Y = A+ C + E (2)
The unexplained factors are often referred to as the non-shared environment, but E
is by definition a residual term which is uncorrelated with A and C. In the standard
version of the model, one further assumes that A and C are uncorrelated for a
given child. On the surface, this seems like a strong assumption and one that could
be defended for randomly assigned adoptees but not for children being raised by
biological parents. An alternative interpretation is that C represents the environment
that is not correlated with genes, while A represents both the contribution from
genetic factors and gene-environment correlations.
With an assumption of no correlation between A, C and E, taking the variance
of both sides of equation (2) and dividing each side by the variance of the outcome
gives:
1 = a2 + c2 + e2
where a2, c2, and e2 represent the normalized variances of A, C, and E, respectively.
From this starting point, a variety of variance and covariances can be expressed as
functions of a, c and e. By standardizing Y , A, C and E to have zero mean and unit
variance, the correlation in outcomes between adoptive and non-adoptive siblings is:
Corr(Y1, Y2) = Cov(C1, C2) = V ar(C1) = c2 (3)
Assuming that biological siblings share half of the same genetic endowment and
the same shared environment, the correlation in outcomes between two biological
siblings is:
Corr(Y1, Y2) = Cov(A1 + C1, A2 + C2) = Cov(A1 + C1, 12A1 + C1) =
1
2a
2 + c2 (4)
Taken together, equations (3) and (4) show how the ACE model can be used to
estimate the full variance breakdown of genetic factors, shared environment, and
unexplained factors from just the correlations in outcomes among biological and
adoptive siblings.
Since stock market participation is a binary variable, we follow Cesarini, Jo-
hannesson, Lichtenstein, Sandewall, and Wallace (2010) in estimating a so-called
threshold model to derive the variance of A, C and E. In a threshold model, choices
are assumed to be determined by crossing certain threshold values of an underlying
distribution of the variable. For each sibling pair the covariance matrices are specified
as below:
a2
SWWWWWWU
1 12 0 0
1
2 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
TXXXXXXV+ c
2
SWWWWWWU
1 1 0 0
1 1 0 0
0 0 1 1
0 0 1 1
TXXXXXXV+ e
2
SWWWWWWU
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
TXXXXXXV
The covariance of A can be rewritten to:
a2
SWWWWWWU
1 12 0 0
1
2 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
TXXXXXXV =
a2
2
SWWWWWWU
1 1 0 0
1 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
TXXXXXXV+
a2
2
SWWWWWWU
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
TXXXXXXV
which gives the following expression (which is the one we use to derive the components,
a2, c2and e2):
a2
2
SWWWWWWU
1 1 0 0
1 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
TXXXXXXV+ c
2
SWWWWWWU
1 1 0 0
1 1 0 0
0 0 1 1
0 0 1 1
TXXXXXXV+ (e
2 + a22 )
SWWWWWWU
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
TXXXXXXV
B. Additional tables and figures
Table B.1. Details about the data sources and each of the variables
Variable: Description:
Assets and
income
Source: Tax, Income, and Wealth Registers, available since 1993
unless otherwise stated
Gross Wealth Tax value of household wealth, available since 1967
Pensionable
Income
All incomes and transfers counting towards old age pensions,
available since 1967
Financial
Wealth
The sum of stocks, mutual funds, money market funds, bank
deposits, bonds
Risky Assets The sum of stocks and mutual funds
Risky Share The ratio of risky assets to financial wealth
Participation Indicator variable for holding a positive amount of Risky Assets
Debt All debt, including mortgage, car loans and student loans
Net Worth The sum of all assets, including the market value of real estate,
minus all debt
Business Income Income from own businesses
Car Owner Indicator variable for household car ownership
Education Source: Norwegian Educational Database, available since 1964
Education
length
Years of schooling
Education type Primary field of study (college major) at the post-secondary level
Financial
Education
Indicator variable for college degree in finance, business or
economics
Adoption Source: Adoption Register, available since 1965
Adoption date Date of adoption
Adoption age Age at time of adoption
Date of birth Date of birth
Country of
origin
Country of birth
Population and
family
Source: The Central Population Register, available since 1964
Region Region of residence at the end of the year
Birth date Date of birth
Variable: Description:
Gender Indicator variable for female
Marital status Indicator variable for married
Spousal ID Unique individual identifier of spouse
Mother ID Unique individual identifier of mother
Father ID Unique individual identifier of father
# of Siblings Number of siblings at time of birth
Employer
information
Source: Employer-Employee register, available since 1995
Firm ID Unique firm identifier
Public sector Indicator variable for working in the public sector
Risky Behavior Source: Register of Criminal Statistics, available since 1995
Speeding ticket Indicator variable for earning at least one speeding ticket (from
automated speeding cameras) over the period 1995-2011
Wealth transfers Source: Register of gifts, transfers and inheritances, available since
1995
Wealth transfers Sum of gifts, inter vivos transfers and inheritances
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Table B.3. Specification check: Measuring child wealth at the level of the household
versus the individual
Korean-Norwegian adoptees
Household level Individual level
A. Dep. variable:
Child (log) financial wealth
Parental:
(log) financial wealth 0.0690 0.0786
(0.0186)*** (0.0199)***
participation -0.0651 -0.0435
(0.1034) (0.1068)
risky share 0.6092 0.5919
(0.2274)*** (0.2340)**
B. Dep. variable:
Child participation
Parental:
(log) financial wealth 0.0069 0.0067
(0.0052) (0.0052)
participation 0.0454 0.0564
(0.0293) (0.0284)**
risky share 0.1299 0.1298
(0.0626)** (0.0615)**
C. Dep. variable:
Child risky share
Parental:
(log) financial wealth 0.0035 0.0016
(0.0022) (0.0026)
participation 0.0015 0.0056
(0.0138) (0.0135)
risky share 0.1250 0.1135
(0.0376)*** (0.0370)***
Notes: Every column of each panel uses the sample of 2 265 Korean-Norwegian adoptees (see Table 1 for further
details) to estimate separate regressions of children’s outcomes as adults on family background variables and a full
set of indicators for birth years of children and parents, year of adoption, age of adoption, and gender of adoptee.
The first (second) column measures the dependent variable at the household (individual) level. Standard errors (in
parentheses) are clustered at the mother. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.
Table B.4. E ects of family background on the probability of earning a speeding
ticket
Dep. variable: Earning a speeding ticket
Full sample Car owners
Parental:
(log) financial wealth 0.0000 0.0015 0.0017 -0.0011
(0.0040) (0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0058)
participation -0.0406 -0.0440 -0.0437 -0.0785
(0.0236)* (0.0236)* (0.0236)* (0.0321)**
risky share 0.0966 0.1113 0.1070 0.1832
(0.0482)** (0.0487)** (0.0490)** (0.0661)***
Additional controls:
Parental education, family income,
# of siblings, and childhood region
Direct wealth transfers
Child education, income,
and financial literacy
Speeding tickets of parents
Number of children 2 265 2 265 2 265 1 444
Notes: Every column of each panel is a separate regressions of children’s outcomes as adults on family background
variables and a full set of indicators for birth years of children and parents and year of adoption. Columns 1-3
use the full sample of Korean-Norwegian adoptees (see Table 1 for further details), while column 4 considers the
subsample of Korean-Norwegian adoptees who own a car. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the
mother. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.
Table B.5. E ects of family background characteristics on sectoral choice
Dep. variable: Public sector employment
Parental:
(log) financial wealth 0.0012 -0.0010 -0.0011
(0.0043) (0.0041) (0.0041)
participation 0.0363 0.0335 0.0334
(0.0256) (0.0249) (0.0251)
risky share -0.0889 -0.1032 -0.1059
(0.0534)* (0.0512)** (0.0518)**
Additional controls:
Parental education, family income,
# of siblings, and childhood region
Direct wealth transfers
Child education, income,
and financial literacy
Sectoral choices of parents
Notes: Every column of each panel is a separate regressions of children’s outcomes as adults on family background
variables and a full set of indicators for birth years of children and parents, year of adoption, age at adoption,
and gender of adoptee. The sample consists of 2 265 Korean-Norwegian adoptees (see Table 1 for further details).
Public sector employment is an indicator variable taking the value of one if the child is working in the public sector
(and zero otherwise). Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the mother. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10.
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Figure B.1. Age-specific child-parent wealth elasticities for the Korean-Norwegian
adoptees and the Norwegian non-adoptees
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Notes: Separately for each age group, we regress child (log) financial wealth on parental (log) financial wealth and
controls for a full set of indicators for birth years of children and parents, and gender of child (and, in the adoption
sample, year and age of adoption). The regressions are run separately for the Korean-Norwegian adoptees and the
Norwegian non-adoptees. The p-values are for the null hypothesis of a child-parent wealth elasticity equal to zero.
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